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Masato Kamikubo
The objective of this paper is to examine the policy-making leaderships undertaken by the Prime
Minister’s O$ce under the Koizumi administration and the process of change in Japan’s Asia policies
during the same period, with a particular focus on the bureaucracy. This paper argues that
bureaucrats still have a strong inﬂuence over the policy-making process even in response to
leaderships arising from the Prime Minister’s O$ce, and that bureaucrats are still the main actors in
the policy-making process. The Prime Minister’s O$ce became a “platform of policy-making” in
which other ministries or agencies could present counter-proposals to a speciﬁc policy area in which
a single ministry or agency monopolised. This paper demonstrates that it is easier for ministries to
propose alternative policies to the Prime Minister in areas such as Asia policy, in which it had
previously been di$cult for the Prime Minister to e#ect change.
Introduction
This paper will examine the policy-making leaderships undertaken by the Prime
Minister’s O$ce under the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) and the process of
change in Japan’s Asia policies during the same period, with a particular focus on the
bureaucracy. Recently numerous papers on this subject have appeared (Iijima 2006,
Shimizu 2005, Takayasu 2005, Takenaka, 2005, Uchiyama 2007, Uesugi 2007,
Yamaguchi 2007). These studies argue that as a result of the establishment of policy
leaderships from the Prime Minister’s O$ce bureaucrats are deprived of their role as
main actors in the policy-making process and that the Prime Minister and other cabinet
members can exert strong leadership.
While previous studies have focused on politicians’ actions they have paid little
attention to bureaucrats as objects of research. The reason for this is that it is generally
thought that politicians can suppress resistance from bureaucrats in the policy-making
process. This paper agrees with the argument that politicians were able to exert strong
leadership during the Koizumi administration. However, it is di$cult to demonstrate
that an enhancement of the functions of the Prime Minister’s O$ce resulted in poli-
ticians’ strong leadership. The new’ Prime Minister’s O$ce, established by the admin-
istrative reforms under the Hashimoto administration, is still new and is not su$ciently
mature as a political institution to enable its e#ect on the policy-making process to be
analysed. In addition, the Koizumi administration was characterised by extremely
strong personalities, including the Prime Minister and other leading ﬁgures in the
government and ruling party. Therefore, it is di$cult to judge whether the strong
leadership exerted by politicians during this period was a result of changes in the
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political institution or a function of the personalities involved.
This paper considers how the changes in the policy-making process through a
functional enhancement of the Prime Minister’s O$ce can be more accurately examined
through an investigation of the bureaucracy which confronts politicians, than through
an analysis of the leadership exerted by the Prime Minister and other political ﬁgures.
The reason for this is that the bureaucracy is a mature political institution. It is argued
that bureaucrats still have a strong inﬂuence over the policy-making process even in
response to leaderships arising from the Prime Minister’s O$ce, and that bureaucrats
are still the main actors in the policy-making process. In contrast to the previous
bureaucracy-led system in which a single ministry or agency monopolised the forma-
tion of a speciﬁc policy, the Prime Minister’s O$ce became a “platform of policy-
making” in which other ministries or agencies could present counter-proposals. As a
result, the Prime Minister could have a more diverse range of choices in the policy-
making process than before government reorganisation.
This paper will present a case study of the policy-making process which led to
Koizumi’s ﬁve initiatives for Japan-ASEAN cooperation and subsequent policy changes.
It is often stated that the Koizumi administration lacked a clear direction for its
diplomatic policy (Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-bu 2005). In fact, however, during his term in
o$ce Koizumi made more overseas visits than any other Japanese Prime Minister
(Iijima 2007, 2). With regard to Asian countries in particular, following the proposal of
the ﬁve initiatives the administration launched a range of bilateral and ASEAN-related
aid policies (Iijima 2007, 58-66). This paper will attempt to analyse bureaucratic
behaviours in the formation of these diplomatic policies.
The structure of this paper is as follows: First, an alternative model of the policy-
making process under the leadership of Prime Minister’s O$ce will be presented and the
changes in Japan’s Asian trade and Asia policy in the 2000s will be analysed as a case
study. Following this, the importance of agenda-setting by the bureaucracy in the
policy-making process will be examined, focusing on bureaucratic responses to the
leaderships from the Prime Minister’s O$ce and responses to Koizumi’s political inten-
tions.
1. An alternative model of the policy-making process under the initiatives of the
Prime Minister’s O$ce
This section focuses on the bureaucracy in presenting an alternative model of
policy-making under the leaderships of the Prime Minister’s O$ce. It is demonstrated
that the bureaucracy still remains the main actor in the policy-making process, even
under the new system. The Prime Minister’s O$ce has been variously deﬁned; for
example, Shinoda (2004) has an exclusive focus on the Cabinet Secretariat, whilst
Takenaka (2005) focuses on the functions of the Council on Fiscal and Economic Policy
(part of the Cabinet O$ce). In this paper, the Prime Minister’s O$ce is deﬁned as the
entire Cabinet rather than simply the Cabinet Secretariat or the Council on Fiscal and
Economic Policy. This is because the organs of the Cabinet other than the Council on
Fiscal and Economic Policy exerted a considerable inﬂuence on change in the Koizumi
Cabinet’s foreign policy.
In previous studies there are no formal models of the policy-making process under
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the leadership of the Prime Minister’s O$ce. However, in terms of the politico-
bureaucratic relationship, the process is described as “the Prime Minister’s O$ce versus
the Ministries.” It is assumed in previous work that the Prime Minister and other
politicians suppressed “resistance” from the ministries and deprived them of a role as a
“main actor” in the policy-making process (Takenaka 2005, Uchiyama 2007). In this
paper, however, bureaucrats are regarded as the “main actors” in the policy-making
process, and an alternative model of the process in which ministries contend with each
other regarding the Prime Minister’s O$ce is presented.
This model assumes that as the number of bureaucrats who are on loan to the Prime
Minister’s O$ce increases ministries can obtain better access to the Prime Minister’s
O$ce. In contrast to the past situation, when the policy process was routinised and a
single ministry would monopolise a speciﬁc policy, ministries can have more opportu-
nity to present alternative proposals to the Prime Minister’s O$ce. As a result, it can be
said that the Prime Minister’s O$ce became a platform for policy-making in which
ministries contend with each other for the realisation of policies or di#erent proposals
from several ministries can converge into single policies. This system allows the Prime
Minister’s O$ce a more diverse range of policy options than before.
2. Koizumi’s ﬁve initiatives for Japan-ASEAN cooperation
In order to test the validity of the model of the policy-making process under the
leadership of the Prime Minister’s O$ce, this section will examine the policy process
leading up to Prime Minister Koizumi’s ﬁve initiatives for Japan-ASEAN cooperation
which he proposed in January 2002. These initiatives resulted in signiﬁcant policy
changes related to which Japan’s trade policy moved from one of WTO-centrism to one
which considered Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and the WTO to be complementary.
In addition, the policy of the internationalization of higher education advanced by the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology1 also underwent a
major shift.
The process leading to Koizumi’s proposal of the ﬁve initiatives will be examined
from three perspectives: agenda-setting by ministries; systemic changes, in particular
the enhancement of the functions of the Prime Minister’s O$ce; and, ministries’ re-
sponses to the political intentions of the Prime Minister’s O$ce. Following this, the
changes to Japan’s Asia policies subsequent to Koizumi’s proposals will be discussed.
2.1 Agenda-setting in the Ministries
Previous studies have not considered the process of agenda-setting in ministries as
a critical one. An “agenda item” is an issue which must be resolved by the government’s
response. “Agenda-setting” is to include the issue on a list of problems to be resolved.
Without agenda-setting the policy-making process cannot begin, and so the authority to
set agendas gives its holders enormous power, enabling them to select issues which are
advantageous to them (Uchiyama 2007, 3738).
In the conventional policy-making process, the bureaucracy monopolised the
authority to set agendas. The ﬁrst stage of the policy process would be discussions in
an advisory committee, which might include academics and representatives of business
circles, where agendas would be set by the bureaucrats acting as the secretariat to the
committee. Then experts would be called to o#er opinions followed by question and
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answer sessions between members of the committee; minutes would be produced and
the next agenda would be formulated. In this process, the role of the members was
simply to engage in question and answer sessions and to endorse the agenda set by the
bureaucrats. This meant that bureaucrats could control discussions in advisory com-
mittees and politicians were unable to intervene because the selection of the committee
members was entirely at the discretion of the bureaucracy. Agendas passed by the
advisory committees would be reviewed by politicians, but again these had been set by
the bureaucracy. Consequently, it can be asserted that bureaucrats holding the author-
ity to set agendas were the main actors in the conventional policy process (Kamikubo
2006, 207215, 259270). This paper considers that under the initiative of the Prime
Minister’s O$ce, the actors who ﬁrst set out new policy ideas are the main actors in the
policy process and so agenda-setting is a signiﬁcant process.
The agenda-setting process leading to the announcement of Koizumi’s ﬁve initia-
tives will be examined. In 1999, a working group called the General Assembly 21st
Century Economic and Industrial Policy Committee was established within the Indus-
trial Structure Council, an advisory committee of the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI). The Administrative Vice-Minister of International Trade and
Industry, Katsusada Hirose, and senior ministry o$cials led discussions in this working
group. They sought to enable the ministry to implement policies that would realise a
world-class level of competitiveness by 2001, after which MITI would be restructured to
become the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). In March 2000, the
working group submitted a report to the Minister for International Trade and Industry.
This report presented a vision of 21st-century industrial policy, dealing with issues
including the promotion of the economic integration of Asia, the promotion of the
liberalisation of trade and investment, the acceptance of Asian students and researchers,
and the promotion of human resource exchanges with Asia.2
These MITI proposals were put into e#ect in a piece-meal manner with little overall
strategy. These included: (1) Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s announcement of a plan
directed towards ASEAN for enhancing the fostering and exchange of human resources
in East Asia. This covered the fostering of highly-specialized human resources, personal
exchanges between citizens and student exchanges. (2) An approximately U.S. $80
billion aid package for the region. (3) The proposal to ASEAN of three principles of
partnership-building, open regional cooperation, and comprehensive dialogue and coop-
eration. These encompassed political and security issues, the establishment of
“e-ASEAN” cooperation in the ﬁeld of IT between Japan, China, and South Korea. (4)
The establishment of the East Asian Industry-University Joint Conference. (5) The
contribution of U.S. $ 1.2 billion for comprehensive IT cooperation with ASEAN, under
Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori.3 However, a comprehensive aid policy for ASEAN
covering all aspects of diplomacy and the economy was not announced.
Meanwhile, in the Central Education Council, an advisory committee of the Minis-
try of Education, the promotion of human resource exchange was being discussed from
the perspective of the “internationalization of higher education.” It aimed to increase the
number of Japanese students studying at U.S. and European universities, and attempted
to achieve a standard of education at Japanese universities equivalent to that available
in the U.S. and Europe. A review of the minutes of meetings of the Central Education
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Council in the 1990s shows that there was no discussion of exchanges of students and
researchers with Asia, in contrast to the MITI committee mentioned above.4
Similarly, there are no records in Ministry of Foreign A#airs (MOFA)-related
materials of any debates on the promotion of diplomatic and economic relations with
the Asian region.5 With regard to trade policy, both MOFA and MITI were WTO-centric
entities. They viewed following the WTO rules for trade liberalization as the corner-
stone of diplomacy and the foundation for economic development, and regarded region-
alism as an impediment to development. FTAs were regarded as nothing more than
tools to supplement the WTO. For example, the Diplomatic Blue Books and Trade
White Papers indicate that the WTO functions e#ectively in building a multi-polar
trade system, and that the maintenance and enhancement of this system is extremely
important to the economic prosperity, not only of Japan but of all countries. With
regard to regional cooperation, the texts indicate that if it accords with WTO treaties it
will promote open trade and contribute to the expansion of global trade, and therefore
has the potential to act as a supplement to the multi-polar trade system. However, they
also point out that the exclusionist character of regional cooperation creates barriers to
countries outside the region and could result in the splitting of the world economy into
protective blocs. This might impede the development of a sound multi-polar trade
system and a competitive environment, and prevent the rational allocation of re-
sources.6 In addition, they stress that the rise of protectionism and regionalism
destabilises the free trade system, necessitating constant vigilance.7
From 1998, MOFA became aware of a new issue with regard to the WTO.8 Within
the approximately 140 member nations of the WTO, objections to trade liberalisation
had been voiced, not only by developing nations but also by advanced nations. It would
therefore be di$cult to achieve a consensus on liberalisation within the WTO frame-
work. Accordingly, MOFA began considering bilateral FTAs as the next best diplo-
matic option.9 The 2000 edition of the Diplomatic Blue Book, in addition to recommend-
ing an early launch of a new round of WTO talks and the strengthening of the
multi-polar trade system, also records an increasing awareness of the importance of
promoting inter-regional, intra-regional, and bilateral cooperation as a supplement to
the multi-polar trade system and as a means of strengthening it. The phrasing had also
changed; regional trade agreements and bilateral FTAs which accorded with WTO
treaties did not represent a barrier to nations outside the region and third-party nations,
but could be considered as promoting open trade and contributing to the expansion of
world trade.10 This marks the beginning of the erosion of WTO-centrism, previously a
ﬁrm principle of Japan’s trade policy, in MOFA. However, there is no evidence of a
contemporaneous examination of this WTO related issue within MITI.11
2.2 Institutional changes, in particular the functional enhancement of the Prime
Minister’s O$ce
Administrative reform was one of the six major reforms instituted by the Hashi-
moto Cabinet, part of which was the restructuring of government ministries and
agencies, which reduced their number from 22 to 12. This restructuring also merged the
General Administrative Agency and the Economic Planning Agency, creating the
Cabinet O$ce (Nakano 1998; Shinoda 1998).
The Old’ Cabinet O$ce prior to the Hashimoto reforms was said to merely take up
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those duties which were not wanted by other ministries and agencies. As the adminis-
trative agency directly under the Prime Minister’s jurisdiction it was responsible for
coordinating policies between other ministries and agencies in areas from national
security to the lifestyles of the nation’s citizens, but it also possessed the least authority
and the least power in securing budget allocations of any ministry or agency.12 While
the organisational relationship between the old Cabinet O$ce and the Cabinet Secretar-
iat is di$cult to deﬁne, sta# members were virtually duplicated and the two agencies
basically seem to represent two sides of the same coin. The Cabinet Secretariat would
function as the general coordinator of important items in relation to Cabinet meetings,
while the old Cabinet O$ce would coordinate policy between ministries, for example, by
liaising in connection with duties straddling di#erent ministries. The old Cabinet O$ce
was made up of the Councillors, the Cabinet Secretariat O$ce, the Cabinet Councillor’s
O$ce on Internal A#airs, the Cabinet Councillor’s O$ce on External A#airs, the
Cabinet Secretariat for Crisis Management, and the Cabinet Public Relations O$ce. It
was administered by sta# dispatched from the ministries who coordinated policy in
each of these areas.13
The transformation of the old Cabinet O$ce into the New’ one was a result of the
importance that the Hashimoto reforms placed on functional enhancement of the
Cabinet. The Act for the Establishment of the Cabinet O$ce states that the newly
created Cabinet O$ce would be an administrative agency headed by the Prime Minister,
to assist the Cabinet Secretariat in the planning and general coordination of important
matters related to national a#airs.14 Concretely, the new Cabinet O$ce enhanced the
functions of the old one by increasing sta# numbers through the establishment of the
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy in the former General Administrative Agency
(Takenaka 2005). As indicated above, the old Cabinet O$ce had no power to draft
policy; its function was simply to coordinate the interests of di#erent ministries when
this became necessary in the case of speciﬁc bills.15 For this reason, when Prime
Ministers sought to mount reforms, they had no choice but to direct the relevant
ministries to formulate bills. As a result, it was often the case that such reform
proposals were watered down by the ministries (Takenaka 2005, 159).
However, with the transfer of the Economic Planning Agency to the newly estab-
lished Cabinet O$ce following the restructuring of the ministries, a policy planning
agency came to be under direct Prime Ministerial authority. The Economic Planning
Agency was a small-scale organisation, but nevertheless had approximately 500 sta#
members.16 In addition, the bureaucrats sta$ng the Economic Planning Agency be-
came involved in the secretariats of a number of organs of policy formation, including
the Council on Fiscal and Economic Policy. By this means, the Prime Minister became
able to directly formulate policy. For instance, as is well known, bureaucrats from the
Economic Planning Agency functioned as the secretariat to the Cabinet O$ce’s Council
on Fiscal and Economic Policy and, under State Minister in Charge of Economic and
Fiscal Policy Heizo Takenaka, played an important role in the realisation of Prime
Minister Koizumi’s structural reforms (Takenaka 2006, 143167, 244325).
The important point is that, traditionally, numerous bureaucrats had been dis-
patched to the Economic Planning Agency from MITI, with the result that it had come
to be known as a “MITI colony”.17 Through the Economic Planning Agency, MITI was
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able to exert considerable inﬂuence on decision-making in the area of government
economic policy. Following the absorption of the Economic Planning Agency into the
Cabinet O$ce, the bureaucrats dispatched to the Agency from MITI became involved in
policy-making within the Cabinet O$ce. One of the three Director Generals for
Economic and Fiscal Management,18 a position which represented a major selling point
of the newly established Cabinet O$ce, came from the heavily MITI-inﬂuenced Eco-
nomic Planning Agency, while two of the three Deputy Director Generals for Economic
and Fiscal Management originated in MITI, and six of the 16 Directors came from the
Economic Planning Agency, with another two from MITI. In addition, numerous sta#
members at middle level and below originated in the Economic Planning Agency or
MITI.19 As a result, following the restructuring of the ministries, METI gained more
channels of access to policy sta# under the direct authority of the Prime Minister than
had been the case in the MITI days. The ministry can, therefore, be seen as having
become able to directly inﬂuence Prime Ministerial decision-making in policy domains
other than economic policy, including foreign policy.20
2.3 Responses of ministries to the political direction of the Prime Minister’s O$ce
To conclude this section, the responses of ministries to the political direction of the
Prime Minister’s O$ce will be discussed. As is well known, Prime Minister Koizumi
adopted a “populist” approach to enable him to triumph in political face-o#s and realise
his structural reforms (Otake 2003, 118119, Uchiyama 2007, 412). Speciﬁcally,
seeking to increase the approval rating of his Cabinet, Koizumi appealed to the public
by labelling those who opposed his reforms as a “resistance force,” by which he created
an easily understandable image of opposition within the government. Generally, the
“resistance force” is taken to refer to LDP special-interest legislators and the bureauc-
racy (Uchiyama 2007, 8). A number of scholars have also pointed out that Koizumi
regarded the “Asian School” of foreign and security policy as a “resistance force”
(Hiwatari, 2007). During the term of the Koizumi Cabinet, the Prime Minister’s visits to
the Yasukuni Shrine caused relations between China and Japan to deteriorate. The
Yasukuni Shrine visits also deepen anti-Chinese sentiment and bolstered nationalist
feeling among Japanese citizens. The “Asian School” was severely criticised by Japa-
nese nationalists, and this is considered to have helped to maintain the high approval
rating of the Koizumi Cabinet (Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-bu 2005).
However, in 2000 China announced that it had agreed to commence FTA negotia-
tions with ASEAN. This news came as a shock to Japan, and the mass media ﬁercely
criticised the government for its delay in commencing FTA negotiations with ASEAN
and other countries. For example, at the time of his round of visits to Southeast Asia in
November 2001, Koizumi had the following exchange with reporters:21
(Reporter) A little earlier you indicated a number of times that you regarded
ASEAN as an important consideration. ASEAN has reached a basic agreement on
formulating a Free Trade Agreement with China. They will be commencing
negotiations. However China may be viewed within ASEAN, this will undoubtedly
enhance relations between the organisation and China. Where will this leave
Japan? Will Japan be left behind by the process of Asian uniﬁcation? What are
your thoughts as Prime Minister on stronger relations between China and ASEAN?
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What action will Japan take in future? Please give us your thoughts on these issues.
(Koizumi) I think that Japanese newspapers often adopt a rather negative perspec-
tive. There is no danger that Japan will be left behind. At today’s Japan-ASEAN
Summit, the ASEAN leaders honestly expressed their high opinion of, and their
gratitude for, the relations that have existed up to the present between Japan and
ASEAN and Japan’s cooperation. This gave me a sense of encouragement. Japan
also welcomes stronger relations between China and ASEAN. Wondering whether
Japan will be left behind, or whether we will decline in the estimation of the ASEAN
nations is overly defeatist, and undervalues what we actually have achieved. This
is a negative aspect of the Japanese mass media. I do not believe that this is going
to happen. ASEAN is genuinely grateful to Japan. We are respected by ASEAN.
For more than 20 years, Prime Ministers have come and gone, but Japan’s stance
with respect to the importance of ASEAN hasn’t waveredthis is how ASEAN
regards us. I was tremendously encouraged to hear this. Japan’s fundamental
stance to date on the importance of ASEAN has not been misguided, and Japan
should continue to provide ASEAN with essential cooperation. Multilateral coop-
eration, cooperation between Japan, China and Korea, Japan-ASEAN cooperation
none of the fundamental principles of these cooperation initiatives has been mis-
guided, and we should keep going ahead on the basis of these principles. I think
that it’s better not to keep thinking, “Oh, Japan’s done for.”
(Reporter) Why is ASEAN forming an FTA with China rather than Japan?
(Koizumi) Well, Japan has enjoyed exceptionally friendly relations with ASEAN. I
hope that Japan will welcome the establishment of friendly relations between
ASEAN and China.
(Reporter) Given that, why China?
(Koizumi) It’s natural for countries to attempt to expand their friendly relations
with other countries.
The business community is also believed to have urged the rapid commencement of
FTA negotiations on Koizumi. Noboru Hatakeyama, Chairman and CEO of the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO), made the following comments directly after
Koizumi’s announcement of his ﬁve initiatives, and they can be seen as expressing the
orientation of Japan’s business community at the time:
Japan’s signing of an FTA with Singapore and the proposal of a vision of economic
partnership that incorporates an FTA with ASEAN is of enormous signiﬁcance.
Japan has here rea$rmed its intention to also pursue FTAs at the same time as
utilizing the WTO framework. [. . .] We have regarded China as a greater threat
than was necessary, and the idea that we had been surpassed by China was a
mistake. [. . .] E#orts to realise Prime Minister Koizumi’s proposals will be essential.
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ASEAN has a strong interest in China, but it is not merely reactive. [. . .] We must
all search for the possibilities available to us, and when we have discovered them,
work to avoid allowing Japan to be left behind.22
2.4 Koizumi’s ﬁve initiatives and subsequent policy changes
Prime Minister Koizumi proposed his ﬁve initiatives for Japan-ASEAN cooperation
in January 2002. Both Koizumi and his predecessor Yoshiro Mori belonged to the
Seiwakai faction of the LDP, which had been led by former Prime Minister Takeo
Fukuda, and thus in terms of foreign policy had a clear orientation towards Asia (Iijima
2007, Kato, 2002). Koizumi’s proposal took over the pro-ASEAN policy stance pursued
by Japan since the propounding of the Fukuda Doctrine, and presented a policy in
which it was developed into a comprehensive vision.22 Koizumi proposed that Japan
should launch initiatives in ﬁve areas: (1) cooperation in education and human resources
development including the dispatch of governmental missions to ASEAN to promote
exchange between universities; (2) designation of 2003 as the Year of Japan-ASEAN
Exchange (the stimulation of exchange in a broad range of areas, including cultural and
intellectual exchange); (3) a Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(strengthening economic partnership in areas ranging from trade and investment to
science, technology and tourism; it was suggested that concrete proposals should be put
forward at the Japan-ASEAN Summit); (4) East Asian Development beginning with the
convening of a meeting at which participants could discuss the best courses for future
development and cooperation to achieve a higher level of prosperity and development
in the region; and, (5) enhanced security cooperation between Japan and ASEAN
including transnational issues. The speech made by Koizumi in Singapore in 2002 also
included the following statement:
Our goal should be the creation of a community that acts together and advances
together’. And we should achieve this through expanding East Asia cooperation
founded upon the Japan-ASEAN relationship. Through this cooperation, I expect
that the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and
New Zealand will be core members of such a community. (Oike 2007)
In relation to the Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership (strengthening
economic partnership in areas ranging from trade and investment to science, technol-
ogy and tourism), Koizumi later commenced a series of policies to support East Asian
cooperation. These included the establishment in 2002 of a network of think tanks to
provide theoretical support for Japan’s East Asia policies, and the announcement of the
acceptance of an increased number of East Asian researchers to assist in the enhance-
ment of countermeasures against terrorism; and, in 2005 the provision of U.S. $ 135
million in aid to combat avian inﬂuenza and 7.5 billion yen as an integrated aid package
for ASEAN.23 These schemes can be seen as realising the “Optimal Course for Industrial
Policy in the 21st Century” proposed by METI. In addition, following Koizumi’s
announcement of his ﬁve initiatives, Japan moved forward on FTAs with other Asian
nations based on the vision of “comprehensive economic partnerships.” This can be
viewed as the Prime Minister following the orientation of MOFA.
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Following Koizumi’s announcement of his initiatives in January 2002, the govern-
ment was subjected to a variety of criticisms by the Japanese media: that Japan was
slow in taking action compared to China, which had reached the stage of signing a
framework agreement conﬁrming the progress of its FTA negotiations with ASEAN;
that Japan’s ministries had not formulated a uniﬁed stance on FTAsthe Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries opposed the liberalization of the agricultural sector,
and there was discord between METI and MOFA; and, that China was overtaking
Japan’s position in the region with Japan having no blueprint for liberalization of the
agricultural sector and no clear strategy for regional economic diplomacy, such as
launching FTA negotiations.24 In addition, Koizumi was urged to amend his vague
stance on FTAs (“Our FTA strategy is to commence with the countries where the
possibility is greatest”), and to exert stronger leadership in advancing FTA negotiations
in a similar way to China whose leaders were perceived as personally carrying their
nation through di$cult FTA negotiations.25
The WTO-centrism which had been the fundamental principle of Japan’s trade
policy was also undermined. The Diplomatic Blue Book indicates that MOFA had
examined the potential for strengthening inter- and intra-regional and bilateral eco-
nomic cooperation.26 This was based on a conception that the multi-polar trade system
could be supplemented and strengthened by bilateral and regional trade liberalisation,
and that this could go beyond levels currently attainable under the WTO and in ﬁelds
to which current WTO treaties did not su$ciently extend. The Blue Book also pointed
out that FTAs and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were e#ective means of
establishing frameworks for economic cooperation beyond the remit of the WTO, and
that their use had increased rapidly in recent years as means of supplementing and
enhancing the multi-polar trade system centred on the WTO.27 It was also stated that
Japan, while considering the maintenance and strengthening of the WTO-centered
multi-polar trade system as fundamental and while also attempting to ensure confor-
mity with the WTO, would adopt ﬂexible economic diplomacy policies in the form most
desirable for the nation, taking into consideration the characteristics of potential
partner countries or regions and their relationship with Japan.28 The Blue Book further
stressed that establishing EPAs and FTAs was of great signiﬁcance in expanding the
scope of Japan’s external economic relations.29 MOFA also published “Japan’s FTA
Strategy” in 2002, which deﬁnes FTAs as an important means of securing increased
beneﬁts for Japan.30
The principle of WTO-centrism also underwent modiﬁcation at METI. Takeo
Hiranuma, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, asserted on countless occa-
sions the necessity of proceeding with FTA negotiations when responding to questions
in the Diet or speaking at press conferences. The following response made during an
interview with the Asahi Shimbun can serve as an example:31
It will probably take some time to conclude an FTA with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but it is essential that we do so. [. . .] Bilateral
and regional FTAs are the way the world is heading. The conclusion of our FTA
with Singapore is groundbreaking for us, being our ﬁrst. [. . .] China established an
FTA with ASEAN before us, but we have formed a specialist committee to work on
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one of our own.
After the publication of the Diplomatic Blue Book in 2000, expressions used to discuss
issues in METI’s Trade White Paper began to move away from WTO-centric statements,
as in the following examples: “Reinvigoration of the domestic economy through the
introduction of East Asian growth factors” (2002);32 “Flexible negotiation and the
formation of consensus is becoming di$cult in the WTO framework” (2002);33 “Systema-
tization of the East Asian business zone” (2003);34 “Exploitation of the di#erent charac-
teristics of the global framework of the WTO and the regional framework of ASEAN
3”(2003);35 “Potential to function as a “WTO-plus” mechanism, enabling rules to be
formulated in ﬁelds not treated or insu$ciently covered by the WTO” (2004);36 “High-
quality East Asian economic integration” (2005);37 and, “FTAs, which supplement the
deﬁciencies of the WTO”. In short, it is clear that the year 2000 represented the point of
commencement of a process in which a convergence occurred between policy principles
introduced by MOFA and the orientation of METI, leading to a policy transformation
from WTO-centrism to a vision of mutual complementarity between the WTO and
FTAs.
In addition, the goal of the “internationalisation of higher education” was trans-
formed from one of internationalising Japan’s universities to building a higher educa-
tion network between Japan and the rest of Asia. Various initiatives were started
including: cooperation between Japanese and overseas universities; the acceptance of
increased numbers of foreign students at Japanese universities; the encouragement of
overseas study for Japanese university students and the personnel of Japanese compa-
nies and government departments; and, the institution of double degrees between
Japanese and overseas universities (Kuroda 2008). The internationalisation of higher
education was discussed in a variety of government departments and by a variety of
deliberative committees (the Education Rebuilding Council, the Council on Economic
and Fiscal Policy, the Council for Science and Technology Policy, the Innovation 25
Strategy Council, the Council for Asian Gateway Initiative, the Council for Regulatory
Reform, and the Central Education Council), and became an issue in relation to which a
number of actors vied to realise policy.38
Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Koizumi had no apparent interest in foreign or
trade policy, even having been termed as “deaf to diplomacy”.39 This would tend to
indicate that Koizumi did little more than utilise policy ideas honed by the bureaucracy
in order to achieve victory in political conﬂicts, and that the real “main actors” in the
policy-making process were the bureaucrats of METI and MOFA who set the agendas.
2.5 Analysis of the policy process leading to Koizumi’s ﬁve initiatives
The process leading to Koizumi’s announcement of his ﬁve initiatives was driven by
ministries that understood the political intentions of the Prime Minister’s O$ce. The
scene can be described as follows:
When he became Prime Minister, Koizumi had little interest in foreign or trade
policy. However, the agreement reached between China and ASEAN in 2000 to
commence FTA negotiations sparked criticism from the media and the business com-
munity, and necessitated the development of policies to resist the further rise of China.
A MITI advisory committee on the “Optimal Course for Industrial Policy in the 21st
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Century” had already reported a variety of proposals related to the later Koizumi
initiatives. These included economic uniﬁcation, trade and investment liberalisation
and the promotion of human resource exchanges. METI viewed Koizumi’s search for
policies to respond to China as a good opportunity to realise the policy proposals made
in the report. There was also a sense of crisis in relation to China within METI itself40
and it can be presumed that METI transmitted policy suggestions via its sta# dis-
patched to the Cabinet O$ce.
In contrast, in the area of trade policy, MOFA had not previously conducted any
deliberations which would allow them to propose policies to respond to China. How-
ever, having become aware of the issues associated with WTO-centrism, the ministry
recognised the necessity of FTAs as a supplement to the WTO, and indicated this to
Koizumi. As a result, there was also a shift away from WTO-centrism towards a vision
of complementarity between the WTO and FTAs. METI and MOFA made policy
proposals to the Prime Minister’s O$ce that accorded with the political intentions of the
Prime Minister. As these proposals were implemented, the existing policy orientations
of the ministries underwent change and policy shifts occurred.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the leaderships undertaken by the Prime Minister’s O$ce
in the policy-making system and policy change under the Koizumi Cabinet with a focus
on the bureaucracy. Previous studies generally asserted that such leaderships by the
Prime Minister’s O$ce enabled politicians to control bureaucrats, resulting in politi-
cians becoming “main actors” in policy formation. However, in this paper the impor-
tance of agenda-setting in the policy process was speciﬁcally focused on, asserting that
it was the bureaucracy which set policy agendas and utilised politicians to realise those
agendas. Bureaucrats thus remained the main actors in the policy process.
As a case study, this paper analysed Prime Minister Koizumi’s ﬁve initiatives,
proposed in January 2002, for cooperation with ASEAN. These initiatives were in
response to the announcement in 2000 that China and ASEAN had agreed to commence
FTA negotiations. This paper demonstrates that such a policy-making process made it
easier for ministries to propose alternative policies to the Prime Minister in areas such
as Asia policy, in which it had previously been di$cult for the Prime Minister to e#ect
change, and higher education policy, which had previously been monopolised by the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. As a result, policies
converged into a direction closer to the Prime Minister’s intentionmounting a re-
sponse to Chinaand the Prime Minister was able to apply these policies.
Given this, rather than viewing the shift in Japan’s Asia policy as emerging from the
political control of bureaucrats enabled by the functional enhancement of the Prime
Minister’s O$ce, it is possible to see it as resulting from the fact that the leaderships
arising from the Prime Minister’s O$ce gave bureaucrats increased ease of access to the
Prime Minister.
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